EXHIBIT 17

	CM-110
ITORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address):	FOR COURT USE ONLY
William J. Goines #61290; Jeremy A. Meier, #139849	
Greenberg Traung, LLP 1900 University Ave., 5 th Fl.	
East Palo Alto, CA 94303	SUPPLE ENDORSED
TELEPHONE NO.: (650) 328-8500 FAX NO. (Optional): (650) 328-8508	Sun Francisco County Superior County OCT 12 2000
MAR ADDRESS (Optional):	County Supplement
ATTORNEY FOR (Name): Defendants Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation, et al.	GORDON PO
JPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF San Francisco STREET ADDRESS: 400 McAllister St., Rm. 103	GORDON PARK-LI, Clerk
MAILING ADDRESS:	FUNARKI O
San Francisco, CA 94102	WOBUT, CIOK
BRANCH NAME:	Oeputy Clark
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Ann Otsuka, et al.	
EFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation, et al.	
CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT	CASE HUMBER:
(Check one): 🔯 UNLIMITED CASE 🔲 LIMITED CASE	CGC-06-452655
(Amount demanded (Amount demanded is \$25,000 exceeds \$25,000) or less)	1
CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE is scheduled as follows:	•-
ate: October 27, 2006 Time: 9:00 a.m. Dept.: 212	Div.: Room;
ddress of court (if different from the address above):	
• •	
Party or parties (answer one): a. This statement is submitted by party (name): b. This statement is submitted jointly by parties (names): Defendants I LLC; Fashions Outlet of America, Inc.; and Polo Retail Corporati	
ELO, I assisons outlet of America, the., and I did Netter outpoints	
Complaint and cross-complaint (to be answered by plaintiffs and cross-complaint	inants only)
a. The complaint was filed on (date);	
b. The cross-complaint, if any, was filed on (date):	•
Service (to be answered by plaintiffs and cross-complainants only) a. All parties named in the complaint and cross-complaint have been served. The following parties named in the complaint or cross-complaint. (1) have not been served (specify names and explain why not):	ed, or have appeared, or have been dismissed.
(2) have been served but have not appeared and have not been d	ismissed (specify names):
(3) have had a default entered against them (specify names):	
c. The following additional parties may be added (specify names, nature of which they may be served):	of involvement in case, and the dale by
Description of case a. Type of case in ⊠ complaint ☐ cross-complaint (describe, including ca Class Action Complaint for Fraud, False Imprisonment, Willful Violat 202 and 203 for failure to pay wages earned, willful failure to provide sections 221, 226 and 232, violations of Business and Professions (Unjust Enrichment and Declaratory Relief.)	tions of Labor Code sections 510, 204, 201, e rest periods willful violations of Labor Code
	r de la companya de
M-110 [Rev. January 1, 2005] CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMEN	T Page 1 of

Case 3:07-cv-02780-SI Document 1-9 Filed 05/29/2007 Page 3 of 44 PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Otsuka, et al. CASE NUMBER: CGC-06-452655 DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: 4. b. Provide a brief statement of the case, including any damages. (If personal injury damages are sought, specify the injury and damages claimed, including medical expenses to date [indicate source and amount], estimated future medical expenses, lost earnings to date, and estimated future lost earnings. If equitable relief is sought, describe the nature of the relief.) Plaintiffs were employees of Defendants Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation; Polo Retail, LLC; Fashions Outlet of America, Inc.; and/or Polo Retail Corporation and functioned as retail salespersons. Plaintiffs have filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint for various employment-related claims and wage and hour violations, including breach of contract, fraud, false imprisonment and seek remedies for failure to pay overtime, failure to provide rest and break periods, and failure to make employment records readily available. Plaintiffs have also filed causes of action seeking recovery for declaratory relief, violations of California Business & Professions Code 17200, et seq., and recovery under the Private Attorney General Act. The Complaint seeks an unspecified amount of damages on behalf of the individual and putative class plaintiffs. (If more space is needed, check this box and attach a page designated as Attachment 4b.) 5. Jury or nonjury trial The party or parties request 🔀 a jury trial 🔲 a nonjury trial (if more than one party, provide the name of each party requesting a jury trial): 6. Trial date The trial has been set for (date): a. No trial date has been set. This case will be ready for trial within 12 months of the date of the filing of the complaint (if X b. not, explain): This is a complex wage and employment putative class action case with extensive discovery and class certification motions to be accomplished prior to trial setting. Written and oral discovery can be expected to take place over the next twelve months. Dates on which parties or attorneys will not be available for trial (specify dates and explain reasons for unavailability): 7. Estimated length of trial The party or parties estimate that the trial will take (check one): a. A days (specify number): 4 - 6 weeks П hours (short causes) (specify): 8. Trial representation (to be answered for each party) The party or parties will be represented at trial \(\sum \) by the attorney or party listed in the caption \(\sup \) by the following: a. Attomey: b. Firm: C. Address: Telephone number: d. Fax number: е. E-mail address: f. Party represented: Additional representation is described in Attachment 8. Preference This case is entitled to preference (specify code section): 10. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Counsel has has not provided the ADR information package identified in rule 201.9 to the client and has reviewed ADR options with the client. All parties have agreed to a form of ADR. ADR will be completed by (date): b.

CM-110 [Rev. January 1, 2005]

The case has gone to an ADR process (indicate status):

_	PLA	INTIFF/PETITIONER:	Otsuka, et al.	CGC-06-452655
DE	FEND	DANT/RESPONDENT:	Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation, et al.	
10.		(1) Mediation (2) Nonbinding arbitration (3) Nonbinding before trial; (4) Binding pind (5) Binding pind (6) Neutral cas (7) Other (spee	; order required under Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1612 licial arbitration vate arbitration	section 1141.12 (discovery to remain open until 30 days 2)
	e.	☐ This matter is so limit.	ubject to mandatory judicial arbitration because the	amount in controversy does not exceed the statutory
	f.		o refer this case to judicial arbitration and agrees to section 1141.11.	limit recovery to the amount specified in Code of
	g.	☐ This case is exe	empt from judicial arbitration under rule 1601 (b) of t	the California Rules of Court (specify exemption):
11.	_	lement conference The party or parties	are willing to participate in an early settlement confe	erence (specify when):
12.	a. b.	Reservation of rights Coverage issue Reservation o	es will significantly affect resolution of this case (
13.	India	Bankruptcy Oti	t may affect the court's jurisdiction or processing of the her (specify):	this case, and describe the status.
4.	Rela a. b.	There are comp (1) Name of cas (2) Name of cou (3) Case numbe (4) Status: Additional cases	ırt:	a party):
5.			intend to file a motion for an order bifurcating, sevening party, type of motion, and reasons):	ring, or coordinating the following issues or causes of
6.		An Application for to file such motion but not limited to d	s as may be deemed necessary and appropria	cify moving party, type of motion, and issues): as filed on 9/18/06. Defendants reserve the right ate during the course of this litigation, including ad motions related to discovery, including but not

CM-110 [Rev. January 1, 2005]

Page 3 of 4

	Pt	.AINT	IFF/PETITIONER: Otsuka			CASE NUMBER:	
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation, et al.			CGC-06-452655	5			
17.	Dis a. b.		rry The party or parties have completed a The following discovery will be comple		specified (describe a	ll anticipated disco	very):
			<u>Party</u> Defendants	Third Party De	Requests for Admis	sion	Date December 2007 TBD
	c.		The following discovery issues are antic	ipated (specify):			
18.	Ecc a. b.		aic Litigation This is a limited civil case (i.e., the amount of Civil Procedure sections 90 through 9 This is a limited civil case and a motion of discovery will be filed (if checked, explain should not apply to this case):	8 will apply to th to withdraw the o	is case. case from the economic	: litigation procedure	es or for additional
19.		The	sues party or parties request that the following ference (specify): ling of discovery, class certification m				_
20.	Me a,	et an	d confer The party or parties have met and confe Court (if not, explain):	rred with all part	ies on all subjects requ	ired by rule 212 of t	the California Rules of
	b.		r meeting and conferring as required by in scify): Following hearing on the demu			, the parties agree (on the following
21.			anagement orders case management orders in this case a	re (check one):	🛭 поле 🗌 attached	d as Attachment 21.	
22.	Tot	al nu	mber of pages attached (if any): 0				
rais	ed b	y this	ely familiar with this case and will be fully statement, and will possess the authorit conference, including the written authori	y to enter into sti	ipulations on these issu		
Date	e: O	ctob	er 12, 2006				
Wil	liam	J. G	OÌNES (TYPE OR PRINT NAME)	•		ATURE OF PARTY OR ATTO	ORNEY)
)			
			(TYPE OR PRINT NAME)		(sign	ATURE OF PARTY OR ATTO Ires are attached	ORNEY)

Otsuka, et al. v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation, et al.

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Case No. CGC-06-452655

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Cathy Sandifer, am a citizen of the United States, over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action. I am an employee of GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP, and my business address is 1900 University Avenue, Fifth Floor, East Palo Alto, CA 94303. On October 12, 2006, I served the following documents:

CASE MANAGEMENT STATEMENT

- by transmitting via FACSIMILE the document(s) listed above to the fax numbers) set forth below, or as stated on the attached service list, on this date at approximately ______, from the sending facsimile machine telephone number of 650-289-7893. The transmission was reported as complete and without error by the machine. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 2008(e)(4), I caused the machine to print a transmission record of the transmission, a copy of which is attached to the original of this declaration. The transmission report was properly issued by the transmitting facsimile machine.
 - by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the UNITED STATES MAIL at East Palo Alto, California, addressed as set forth below.
 - by OVERNIGHT MAIL by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed overnight mail envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed as set forth below. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if delivery by Federal Express is more than one day after date of deposit with Federal Express.
 - (BY MESSENGER PERSONAL SERVICE). I caused delivery of such envelope by hand to the offices of the addressee.

Patrick R. Kitchin, Esq. Law Offices of Patrick R. Kitchin 565 Commercial St., 4th Fl. San Francisco, CA 94111 (Fax: 415-627-9076) Daniel Feder, Esq. Law Offices of Daniel L. Feder 807 Montgomery St. San Francisco, CA 94133 (Fax: 415-391-9432)

I am readily familiar with the business practice of my place of employment in respect to the collection and processing of correspondence, pleadings and notices for mailing with United States Postal Service/Express Mail, Federal Express and other overnight mail services. The foregoing sealed envelope was placed for collection and mailing this date consistent with the ordinary business practice of my place of employment, so that it will be picked up this date with postage thereon fully prepaid at East Palo Alto, California, in the ordinary course of such business.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on October 12, 2006, at East Palo Alto, California.

Cathy Sandifer

Proof of Service

EXHIBIT 18

Page 8 of 44

WILLIAM J. GOINES (SBN 061290) JEREMY A. MEIER (SBN 139849) 2 KAREN ROSENTHAL (SBN 209419) ALISHA M. LOUIE (SBN 240863) 3 GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 1900 University Avenue, Fifth Floor East Palo Alto, California 94303 Telephone: (650) 328-8500 Facsimile: (650) 328-8508 Email: goinesw@gtlaw.com meierj@gtlaw.com rosenthalk@gtlaw.com louiea@gtlaw.com

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ENDORSED FILED San Francisco County Superior Court

OGT 1 2 2006

GOREON PARK-LI, Clerk ELIAS SUIT

Daputy Clerk

Attorneys for Defendants Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation; Polo Retail, LLC; Fashions Outlet of America, Inc.; and Polo Retail Corporation

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

ANN OTSUKA, an individual; JANIS KEEFE. an individual; CORINNE PHIPPS, an individual; and JUSTIN KISER, an individual; and on behalf of all other similarly situated,

Plaintiff(s),

POLO RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation; POLO RETAIL, LLC, a Delaware Corporation; POLO RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, doing business in California as POLO RETAIL CORP; FASHIONS OUTLET OF AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation and DOES 1-500, inclusive,

Defendant(s)...

Case No. CGC-06-452655

DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Date:

November 15, 2006

Time:

9:30 a.m.

Dept.:

301

BY FAX

Date Filed:

May 30, 2006

Defendants Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation; Polo Retail, LLC; Fashions Outlet of America,

Inc.; and Polo Retail Corporation (collectively referred to herein as "Defendants") hereby demur to

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the First Amended Complaint ("Complaint") of Plaintiffs Ann Otsuka, an individual; Janis Keefe, an individual; Corinne Phipps, an individual; and Justin Kiser, an individual; and on behalf of all other similarly situated (collectively referred to herein as "Plaintiffs") on the grounds set forth below.

- 1. The First Cause of Action for Fraud fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants under Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(e). Plaintiffs do not allege facts constituting the alleged fraud with sufficient particularity to withstand demurrer under California law.
- 2. The Second Cause of Action for False Imprisonment fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants under Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(e). Plaintiffs' cause of action for false imprisonment as to Plaintiffs Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe is time barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 340(c). Additionally, Plaintiffs have failed to properly plead a cause of action for false imprisonment because Plaintiffs consented to the 14 inspections. Finally, Plaintiffs' cause of action for false imprisonment is barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act, Lab. Code §§ 3600, 3602.
 - 3. The Seventh Cause of Action for Willful Failure to Provide Rest Periods (Labor Code §§ 226.7) fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants under Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(e). Claims by Plaintiffs Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe are time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a) for actions seeking penalties.
 - The Eighth Cause of Action for Willful Violations of Labor Code §§ 226 fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants under Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(e). Claims by Plaintiffs Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe are time-barred by the oneyear statute of limitations set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a) for actions seeking penalties.
 - 5. The Eleventh Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants under Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(e).

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California courts have determined that unjust enrichment is not a cause of action.

The Thirteenth Cause of Action for Recovery Under the California Private 6. 3 Attorneys General Act, Labor Code §§ 2699 et seq., fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants under Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(e). Claims by Plaintiffs Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe are time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth 6 in California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a) for actions seeking penalties.

Said Demurrer will be based on the Notice of Hearing of Defendants' Demurrer to First 8 Amended Complaint, the Demurrer to First Amended Complaint, and the accompanying Memoranda of Points and Authorities in support thereof, the Complaint and other pleadings and 10 papers on file in this action, and on such other and further argument and evidence which may be 11 presented at the hearing on this motion.

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13 Dated: October 12, 2006

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GREENBERG TRAURIG

Jeremy A. Meier Karen Rosenthal

Alisha M. Louie

Attorneys for Defendants Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation; Polo Retail, LLC; Fashions Outlet of America, Inc.; and Polo Retail Corporation

Otsuka, et al. v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation, et al.

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Case No. CGC-06-452655

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Cathy Sandifer, am a citizen of the United States, over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action. I am an employee of GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP, and my business address is 1900 University Avenue, Fifth Floor, East Palo Alto, CA 94303. On October 12, 2006, I served the following documents:

DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

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below, or as stated on the attached service list, on this date at approximately, from the
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Patrick R. Kitchin, Esq. Law Offices of Patrick R. Kitchin 565 Commercial St., 4th Fl. San Francisco, CA 94111 (Fax: 415-627-9076) Daniel Feder, Esq. Law Offices of Daniel L. Feder 807 Montgomery St. San Francisco, CA 94133 (Fax: 415-391-9432)

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Proof of Service

Filed 05/29/2007

Page 12 of 44

Case 3:07-cv-02780-SI Document 1-9

WILLIAM J. GOINES (SBN 061290) JEREMY A. MEIER (SBN 139849) 2 KAREN ROSENTHAL (SBN 209419) ALISHA M. LOUIE (SBN 240863) 3 GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 1900 University Avenue, Fifth Floor ⁴ East Palo Alto, California 94303 Telephone: (650) 328-8500 Facsimile: (650) 328-8508 Email: goinesw@gtlaw.com 6 meierj@gtlaw.com rosenthalk@gtlaw.com louiea@gtlaw.com Attorneys for Defendants Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation; Polo Retail, LLC; Fashions Outlet of America, Inc.; and Polo Retail Corporation 10 11 12 13, 14 15

ENDORSED FILED San Francisco County Superior Court

DCT 1 2 2006

GORDON PARK-LI, Clerk ELIAS BUTT

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

ANN OTSUKA, an individual; JANIS KEEFE, an individual; CORINNE PHIPPS, an individual, and JUSTIN KISER, an individual; and on behalf of all other similarly situated,

Plaintiff(s),

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POLO RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation; POLO RETAIL, LLC, a Delaware Corporation; POLO RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, doing business in California as POLO RETAIL CORP; FASHIONS OUTLET OF AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation and DOES 1-500, inclusive.

Defendant(s)..

Case No. CGC-06-452655

NOTICE OF HEARING OF DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Date:

November 15, 2006

Time:

9:30 a.m.

Dept.:

301

BY FAX

Date Filed:

May 30, 2006

TO PLAINTIFFS AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

NOTICE OF HEARING ON DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on November 15, 2006 at the hour of 9:30 a.m., or as 1 soon thereafter as this matter may be held in Department 301 of the above-entitled Court located at 3 400 McAllister Street, San Francisco, California, Defendants Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation; Polo 4 Retail, LLC; Fashions Outlet of America, Inc.; and Polo Retail Corporation (collectively referred to 5 herein as "Defendants" or "Polo") will demur to the First Amended Complaint ("Complaint") of 6 Plaintiffs Ann Otsuka, an individual; Janis Keefe, an individual; Corinne Phipps, an individual; and Justin Kiser, an individual; and on behalf of all other similarly situated (collectively referred to herein as "Plaintiffs"). 9 Said demurrer will be based on the accompanying Demurrer to First Amended Complaint, 10 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Complaint, all other pleadings and files in this matter, and such other and further argument which may be presented at the hearing on this matter. Dated: October 12, 2006 13

GREENBERG TRAURIG

Jeremy A. Meier Karen Rosenthal

Alisha M. Louie

Attorneys for Defendants Polo Ralph

Lauren Corporation; Polo Retail, LLC;

Fashions Outlet of America, Inc.; and Polo

Retail Corporation

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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on October 12, 2006, at East Palo Alto, Çalifornia. Cathy Sandifer

Proof of Service

MESSAGE CONFIRMATION

10/12/2006 14:29 ID=GREENBERG TRAURG LLP

DATE 10/12 S.R-TIME

DISTANT STATION ID 07'01" 415 627 9076

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10/12/2006

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GREENBERG TRAURG LLP > 321#093800#914156279076#

NO.442

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Greenberg Traurig

William J. Goines

Transmittal Cover Sheet

From: Cathy Sandifer, Secretary to

Tel:

650.289.7862

#-Mail:

sandiferc@gtlaw.com

To:	Fax No:	Company:	Phone No.:
Patrick R. Kitchin, Esq Daniel Feder, Esq.	(415) 627-9076 (415) 391-9432	Law Offices of Patrick R. Kitchin Law Offices of Daniel L. Feder	(415) 677-9058 (415) 391-9476

File No.:

62321-093800

Re:

Otsuka, et al. v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation, et al.

Date:

October 12, 2006

No. Pages:

Including Cover Sheet

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If you do not receive all pages properly, please call the sender.

Notes:

Please see the attached Demurrer documents and our Case Management

Statement, which were filed this afternoon with the court.

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The information contained in this transmission is attorney privileged and confidential. It is intended only for the use of the individual or entity named above. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notity us immediately by telephone collect and return the original message to us at the eddress below via the U.S. Postal Service. We will reimburse you for your postage. Thank you.

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Greenberg **Traurig**

Transmittal Cover Sheet

From: Cathy Sandlfer, Secretary to William J. Goines

Tel:

650.289.7862

E-Mail:

sandiferc@gtlaw.com

	Na	Company:	Phone No.:
Patrick R. Kitchin, Esq	(415) 627-9076	and the Manham	(415) 677-9058
Daniel Feder, Esq.	(415) 391-9432		(415) 391-9476

File No.:

62321-093800

Re:

Otsuka, et al. v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation, et al.

38

Date:

October 12, 2006

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Statement, which were filed this afternoon with the court.

Also sent via:		Overnight		Email	No Other
			and confidential. It is Inten- ecipient, you are hereby neceived this communicativess below via the U.S. Po		
copying of this communications of the communications collect and n	inication is stoctly pro- eturn the original mest	sage to us at the addr	received this communicativess below via the U.S. Po	stal Service. We w	ill reimburse you for your

WILLIAM J. GOINES (SBN 061290) JEREMY A. MEIER (SBN 139849) KAREN ROSENTHAL (SBN 209419) ALISHA M. LOUIE (SBN 240863) GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 1900 University Avenue, Fifth Floor East Palo Alto, California 94303 Telephone: (650) 328-8500 Facsimile: (650) 328-8508 Email: goinesw@gtlaw.com meierj@gtlaw.com rosenthalk@gtlaw.com louiea@gtalw.com

ENDORSED FILED San Francisco Countr Superior Court

OCT 1 2 2006

GONDON PARKLI, Clerk **ELIAS BUTT** Deputy Clerk

8 Attorneys for Defendants Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation, Polo Retail, LLC, Fashions Outlet 9 of America, Inc., and Polo Retail Corporation

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

ANN OTSUKA, an individual; JANIS KEEFE, an individual; CORINNE PHIPPS, an individual; and JUSTIN KISER, an individual; and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

POLO RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation; POLO RETAIL, LLC., a Delaware Corporation; POLO RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, doing business in California as POLO RETAIL CORP; FASHIONS OUTLET OF AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation and DOES 1-500, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. CGC-06-452655

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND **AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF** DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Date:

November 15, 2006

Time:

9:30 a.m.

Dept.:

301

BY FAX

Date Filed:

May 30, 2006

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II.	PLA	INTIFFS' FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS	1
III.	LEG.	AL ARGUMENT	2
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INTRODUCTION

Defendants Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation; Polo Retail, LLC; Fashions Outlet of America, Inc., and Polo Retail Corporation (collectively referred to herein as "Polo") hereby demur to the First Amended Complaint ("Complaint") of Plaintiffs Ann Otsuka, an individual, Janis Keefe, an individual, Corinne Phipps, an individual, and Justin Kiser, an individual, and on behalf of all other individuals similarly situated (collectively referred to herein as "Plaintiffs") as follows.

Polo demurs to the following causes of action alleged against them in Plaintiffs' Complaint: the First Cause of Action for Fraud, the Second Cause of Action for False Imprisonment, the Seventh Cause of Action for Willful Failure to Provide Rest Periods (as to claims by Plaintiffs Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe), the Eighth Cause of Action for Willful Violations of Labor Code §§ 226 (as to claims of Plaintiffs Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe), the Eleventh Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment, and the Thirteenth Cause of Action for Recovery Under the Private Attorneys General Act (as to claims of Plaintiffs Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe). For the reasons discussed in greater detail below, Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to allege facts necessary to establish the elements of those claims and/or allege those facts with the required specificity to withstand demurrer and/or allege the violations within the requisite statutes of limitation periods.

Accordingly, Polo's demurrer to each of the above causes of action should be sustained.

II. PLAINTIFFS' FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

As pled on the face of their Complaint, Plaintiffs base their causes of action for Fraud, False Imprisonment, Willful Failure to Provide Rest Periods, Willful Violations of Labor Code § 226, Unjust Enrichment, and Recovery Under the Private Attorneys General Act on the following factual allegations:

- Defendants do not provide employees with a base rate of pay as Defendants promise in their Sales Associate Handbook. Complaint, ¶ 13, p. 4. Defendants have established a wage system they call "Base Rate Against Commission," and which they characterize as a bone fide commission based system, when it fact it is not. Defendants' wage system is an illegal scheme designed to avoid the wage rules and overtime regulations. Complaint, ¶ 13, p. 7.
- Defendants falsely promise employees that they will perform an end-of the-year wage reconciliation to determine which employees are eligible to receive premium overtime compensation for work performed during the entire course of the previous year; however, Defendants have failed to do so. Complaint, ¶ 13, pp. 4-5.

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- Defendants represent to all of their employees that they will be permitted to take two 15-minute rest breaks during an eight-hour shift; however, Defendants do not, in fact, provide employees with rest breaks. Complaint, ¶ 13, pp. 4, 6-7.
- Defendants routinely require all of their employees to perform work "off the clock" for which they are not paid. Complaint, ¶ 13, p. 5. Defendants routinely fraudulently manipulate Plaintiffs' time records to keep Defendants' employees from receiving wages for all hours they worked. Complaint, ¶ 13, p. 5.
- Defendants require employees at the end of their shifts to stand in line and/or remain in their locked stores, for up to one half hour to undergo a loss prevention search by managers after the employees have clocked out. Complaint, ¶ 13, pp. 5-6.
- Defendants fail to maintain proper records memorializing the hours worked by their employees, the compensation paid to them, and the debits made to their wages, and fail to make accurate payroll records available upon request. Complaint, ¶ 13, p. 8.
- Defendants maintain an illegal and unconscionable charge back or returns policy that permits Defendants to collect from their employees' wages previously paid. Because Defendants have misclassified their employees as bona fide commissioned employees, Defendants' application of a commission-based charge back system is illegal, inequitable and unconscionable. Complaint, ¶ 13, p. 7.
- Defendants expressly prohibit their employees from disclosing their wages to fellow employees. Complaint, ¶ 13, p. 9.

LEGAL ARGUMENT III.

RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARD A.

A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a complaint, i.e., whether the complaint states facts 17 sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based. Kong v. City of 18 Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency, 108 Cal. App. 4th 1028, 1037 (2002), citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 430.10(e); Friedland v. City of Long Beach, 62 Cal. App. 4th 835, 841-42 (1998). In 20 determining whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial 21 court may consider all well-pled material facts pleaded in the complaint and those arising by reasonable implication. Kong, 108 Cal. App. 4th at 1037; Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners 23 Assn., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 132 Cal. App. 4th 1076, 1096 (2005). The court may not 24 consider contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. Kong, 108 Cal. App. 4th at 1037 25 citing Moore v. Conliffe, 7 Cal. 4th 634, 638 (1994); Montclair Parkowners Assn. v. City of 26 Montclair, 76 Cal. App. 4th 784, 790 (1999).

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A demurrer also lies where the pleading is "uncertain," i.e., when it is ambiguous or 2 unintelligible. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 430.10(f). "[I]n pleading, the essential facts upon which a 3 determination of the controversy depends should be stated with clearness and precision so that 4 nothing is left to surmise. Those recitals, references to, or allegations of material facts which are 5 left to surmise are subject to special demurrer for uncertainty." Ankeny v. Lockheed Missiles & 6 Space Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 531, 537 (1979).

A court may sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if it reasonably appears that the 8 complaint does not state factual allegations sufficient to support a cause of action, and that no amendment will cure the defects. See Tyco Indus. v. Superior Court, 164 Cal. App. 3d 148 (1984).

В. THE DEMURRER TO THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD SHOULD BE SUSTAINED BECAUSE IT IS NOT PLED WITH THE REQUISITE PARTICULARITY.

Plaintiffs' first cause of action for fraud fails because Plaintiffs do not allege facts 13 constituting the alleged fraud with sufficient particularity to withstand demurrer under California 14 law.

In California, "fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not 16 suffice." Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 979, 993 (2004), citing Lazar v. 17 Superior Court, 12 Cal. 4th 631, 645 (1996). This particularity requirement necessitates pleading 18 facts which "show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were 19 tendered." Lazar at 645, citing Stansfield v. Starkey, 220 Cal. App. 3d 59, 73 (1990).

Plaintiffs' actual descriptions fall far short of the specificity required to plead a valid fraud 21 claim. Plaintiffs offer only cursory general allegations, which fail to provide the facts required for 22 fraud allegations.

The following facts are alleged on behalf of all Plaintiffs:

- Polo misrepresented to Plaintiffs "the wages they will be paid while working at Defendants' stores." Complaint, ¶ 70(a).
- Polo promised their employees that "their base rate of pay, computed as the employees' hourly pay rate times the hours actually worked, would serve as a guaranteed minimum wage payment," and that while employees "may earn additional wages by selling more products, they will never be paid less than their base rate of pay." Complaint, ¶ 70(a).

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- Polo misrepresented to Plaintiffs that "they will perform an end-of-the-year wage reconciliation and pay premium overtime wages" and that Polo "will properly record their employees' time and pay all wages due in a timely manner." Complaint, ¶ 70(b).
- Polo misrepresented that employees "will be provided rest breaks in compliance with California law." Complaint, ¶ 70(c).
- When Plaintiffs "began working for Defendants," Tin Hua, General Manager, told Plaintiffs that they would "be compensated as a draw versus commission employee". Complaint, ¶¶ 16 (Plaintiff Otsuka), 26 (Plaintiff Phipps), 37 (Plaintiff Kiser), and 47 (Plaintiff Keefe).
- Plaintiffs were told that their wages would increase as they increased their sales. Complaint, ¶¶ 16 (Plaintiff Otsuka), 26 (Plaintiff Phipps), 37 (Plaintiff Kiser), and 47 (Plaintiff Keefe).

The individual Plaintiffs alleged certain facts, specific to each Plaintiff, in addition to the general allegations set forth above. The following facts are alleged on behalf of Plaintiff Otsuka:

- Otsuka was told that she "would receive greater compensation for sales made in excess of her target sales goals, based on a commission rate of 8% of sales." Complaint, ¶ 16.
- Otsuka was told that "her base rate, based on her hourly wage multiplied by the total hours she worked, would serve as a guaranteed wage payment." Complaint, ¶ 16.
- Otsuka was "promised healthcare insurance after she worked for 90 days." Complaint, ¶ 17.

The following facts are alleged on behalf of Plaintiff Phipps:

- Phipps was told that her "hourly rate would constitute a base guaranteed wage." Complaint, ¶ 26.
- Phipps was "promised healthcare insurance after she worked for 90 days." Complaint, ¶ 27.

The following facts are alleged on behalf of Plaintiff Kiser:

• Kiser was told that his "hourly rate would constitute a base guaranteed wage." Complaint, ¶ 37.

The following facts are alleged on behalf of Plaintiff Keefe:

- Keefe was told that her "hourly rate would constitute a base guaranteed wage."
 Complaint, ¶ 47.
- Keefe was "promised healthcare insurance after she worked for 90 days." Complaint, ¶ 48.

"

WHEN:

WHERE:

HOW:

The above general allegations are insufficient as a matter of law to plead a cause of action for fraud because the allegations are not pled with the requisite particularity. Plaintiffs fail to provide basic information about the alleged false statements and misrepresentations, including:

WHO: Plaintiffs frequently allege that "Defendants" made misrepresentations, without indicating the person who made such statements.

> Plaintiffs fail to indicate precisely when each alleged false statement was made. Plaintiffs only offer a vague time frame such as "when [Plaintiff] began working for Defendants". Such a description fails to provide sufficient information for Polo to investigate when Plaintiffs were given allegedly false information.

Plaintiffs do not identify where the alleged false representations were made. Plaintiffs fail to describe the means by which Polo made allegedly false statements; i.e., the context of the representations and whether those representations were oral, written or a combination of both.

As the claims are currently pled, Plaintiffs have not provided enough detail to enable Polo 16 or the Court to assess whether the alleged statements constitute fraud. See Goldrich v. Natural Y Surgical Specialties, Inc., 25 Cal. App. 4th 772 (1994) ("Even in a case involving numerous oft-18 repeated misrepresentations, the plaintiff must, at a minimum, set out a representative selection of 19 the alleged misrepresentations sufficient to permit the trial court to ascertain whether the 20 statements were material or otherwise actionable." <u>Id.</u> at 783, <u>citing Committee on Children's</u> <u>Television, Inc.</u>, 35 Cal. 3d 197 at 218).

"To withstand a demurrer, the facts constituting every element of the fraud must be alleged 23 with particularity, and the claim cannot be salvaged by references to the general policy favoring the 24 liberal construction of pleadings." Goldrich, 25 Cal. App. 4th at 782-783 (emphasis added).

In the present case, the Complaint does not sufficiently state the facts necessary to properly 26 allege fraud. Thus, Polo's demurrer to Plaintiffs' first cause of action for fraud should be 27 sustained.

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AINTIFFS' SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FALSE IMPRISONMENT SHOULD BE SUSTAINED BECAUSE IT IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs have alleged that Polo falsely imprisoned Plaintiffs because Polo allegedly requires employees at the end of their shifts to stand in line and/or remain in their locked stores, for up to one half hour, to undergo a loss prevention search by managers after the employees have clocked out. Complaint, ¶ 13, pp. 5-6. For the reasons set forth below, Polo's demurrer should be sustained.

1. The Claim of False Imprisonment By Plaintiffs Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe Should Be Dismissed Since These Claims Are Barred By the Statute of Limitations.

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiffs' cause of action for false imprisonment as to Plaintiffs Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe is time barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 340(c). Under this 13 provision, an action for false imprisonment must be pled within one year after the cause of action arose. Code Civ. Proc. § 340(c); Kaufman v. Brown, 93 Cal. App. 2d 508 (1949). Since Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed on May 30, 2006, a cause of action for false imprisonment must have arisen no sooner than May 30, 2005. Since, as Plaintiffs allege, Otsuka terminated her employment with Polo in or about November 2004 (Complaint ¶ 1), Phipps in or about December 2004 (Complaint ¶ 2), and Keefe in or about December 2004 (Complaint ¶ 4), the cause of action for false imprisonment as to these Plaintiffs is time-barred by the statute of limitations imposed by section 340(c). Accordingly, the Demurrer as to Plaintiffs' second cause of action should be sustained as to Plaintiffs Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe.

2. The Demurrer Should Be Sustained Since Plaintiffs Have Pled That They Consented to Loss Prevention Searches

Since Plaintiffs have pled that they consented to the inspection of their shopping bags, briefcases, totes, handbags or other items ("loss prevention searches") by Polo, Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to allege facts that support their cause of action for false imprisonment. False imprisonment is "the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another." Pen. Code, § 236. To properly plead a cause of action for false imprisonment, Plaintiffs must show: (1) the

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1 nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person; (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief. Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 701, 715. For the 3 reasons that will be discussed below, Polo's demurrer should be sustained as to this cause of action because Plaintiffs are unable to show that they were intentionally confined without their consent.

Here. Plaintiffs specifically pled that they "were warned in Defendants' Retail Employee 6 Handbook at page 26, that all packages and bags are subject to inspection before the employee may 7 exit the store, and that this requirement is 'a condition of employment." (Complaint at ¶13, pp 8 6:13-16.) By becoming employees of Polo, Plaintiffs consented to this particular condition of 9 employment. Accordingly, "loss prevention searches" is an explicit condition of employment for 10 which Plaintiffs provided their consent. Loss prevention searches —without more—cannot form the basis of a false imprisonment claim. Plaintiffs' own factual allegations show that they consented to loss prevention searches.

Plaintiffs' False Imprisonment Cause Of Action Is Barred By The 3. Exclusive Remedy Provisions Of The Workers' Compensation Law

Plaintiffs' cause of action for false imprisonment is further barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act ("exclusivity provisions")(Lab. Code §§ 3600, 3602). Since Plaintiffs' factual allegations do not amount to false imprisonment, as discussed above, because Plaintiffs consented to "loss prevention searches" as a condition of their employment, the "loss prevention searches" are therefore part of the compensation bargain and are barred from being actionable under the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act.

Under Labor Code section 3600(a), workers' compensation liability exists "in lieu of any other liability whatsoever" against any employer for injury sustained by its employees "arising out of and in the course of employment." Lab. Code § 3600(a). "[T]he basis for the exclusivity rule in workers' compensation law is the 'presumed' 'compensation bargain,' pursuant to which the employer assumes liability for industrial personal injury or death without regard to fault in exchange for limitations on the amount of that liability. Fermino, 7 Cal.4th at 708. The very issue of whether the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act barred an employee's civil action for false imprisonment was the subject of Fermino v. Fedco, supra.

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In Fermino, the plaintiff brought an action for false imprisonment against defendant employer. The plaintiff alleged that she was falsely imprisoned when she was interrogated in a windowless room at work, where she was accused of stealing. Plaintiff employee made allegations that she was kept in the room against her will for more than an hour and was released only when she became hysterical. In determining whether an action for false imprisonment is barred by the exclusivity provisions, the court found that reasonable attempts to investigate an employee for theft, including interrogation, are a normal part of the employment relationship and entitled to the protection of the exclusivity provisions. Id. at 717. However, actions by an employer that go beyond the bounds of reasonable interrogations and detention, such that the actions amount to false imprisonment, are not entitled to protection under the exclusivity provisions. Id. Accordingly, the court found that once it is determined that false imprisonment has taken place, the action of the employer "cannot be said to be a normal aspect of the employment relationship" and therefore is "always outside the scope of the compensation bargain." Id. at 723.

Whereas here, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts supporting their cause of action for false imprisonment since they allege facts showing their consent to Polo's "loss prevention searches" and since they fail to allege facts that show that Polo's loss prevention searches were done outside the scope of a reasonable attempt to investigate employee theft as part of a normal course of the employment relationship, the exclusivity provisions remain in effect and bar Plaintiffs' cause of action for false imprisonment.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs' cause of action for false imprisonment is not sufficiently pled and Polo's demurrer should be sustained.

D. THE DEMURRER TO THE SEVENTH, EIGHTH, AND THIR USES OF ACTION FOR VIOLATIONS OF LABOR CODE SECTIONS 7, 226, AND 2699 SHOULD BE SUSTAINED AS TO PLAINTIFFS OTSUKA, PHIPPS AND KEEFE BECAUSE EACH OF THESE ALLEGED MITATIONS.

Polo demurs to the Seventh, Eighth and Thirteenth Causes of Action because the claims are precluded by California's one-year statute of limitations for actions seeking penalties. California

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Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a) provides a one-year statute of limitations for "an action upon a 2 statute for a penalty or a forfeiture, if the action is given to an individual, or to an individual and 3 the state[.]" Any liability constituting a penalty is unambiguously excepted from the three-year 4 statute of limitations period of Code of Civil Procedure § 338, subdivision (a), which applies to "[a]n action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture." (emphasis 6 added.)

In this instance, Plaintiffs allege certain California Labor Code violations which subject Polo to penalties and are therefore subject to the one-year statute of limitations set forth under California Code of Civil Procedure § 340.

1. Labor Code Section 226.7

California Labor Code § 226.7 creates a penalty to which the one-year limitations period of Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a), applies. Labor Code § 226.7 provides:

> (b) If an employer fails to provide an employee a meal period or rest period in accordance with an applicable order of the Industrial Welfare Commission, the employer shall pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee's regular rate of compensation for each work day that the meal or rest period is not provided.

Cal Lab Code § 226.7.

Any payments made under this section are not an employee benefit given for labor 18 performed, but instead are a sanction or punishment for failure to provide work accommodations 19 such as adequate meal breaks. Because Labor Code § 226.7 reflects a penalty for statute of 20 limitations purposes, the one-year limitations period applies, and Plaintiffs failed to bring this 21 action within one year.

2. Labor Code Section 2699

Plaintiffs have asserted that they intend to serve as private attorneys general under the 24 California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ("PAG Act"), Labor Code §§ 2699 et seq. Labor 25 Code § 2699 provides:

Several California cases in the last decade have held that payments made under Labor Code § 226.7 are penalties; however, the California Supreme Court granted review of this issue on 28 February 22, 2006. See Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, 130 P.3d 519, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 750 (2006).

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(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any provision of this code that provides for a civil penalty to be assessed and collected by the Labor and Workforce Development Agency or any of its commissions, departments. divisions. boards. agencies. employees, for a violation of this code, may, as an alternative, be recovered through a civil action brought by an aggrieved employee on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees pursuant to the procedures specified in Section 2699.3.

Cal Lab Code § 2699 (emphasis added). This statute provides that Plaintiffs can step into the state 7 agency's shoes and sue to recover penalties owed by an employer. Such penalties are split with the state following recovery.

The Act allows employees to sue employers directly for civil penalties for purported Labor Code violations. As courts have recognized, "the PAG Act empowers or deputizes an aggrieved employee to sue for civil penalties 'on behalf of himself or herself and other current or former employees". Dunlap v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 4th 330, 337 (2006) (emphasis added). The 13 statute's legislative history indicates that the PAC Act provides for recovery of penalties:

> The Legislature declared its intent as follows: "(c) Staffing levels for state labor law enforcement agencies have, in general, declined over the last decade and are likely to fail to keep up with the growth of the labor market in the future. [P] (d) It is therefore in the public interest to provide that civil penalties for violations of the Labor Code may also be assessed and collected by aggrieved employees acting as private attorneys general, while also ensuring that state labor law enforcement agencies' enforcement actions have primacy over any private enforcement efforts undertaken pursuant to this act." (Stats. 2003, ch. 906, § 1.)

Dunlap, 142 Cal. App. 4th at 337 (2006) (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs have indicated in the Complaint that they are seeking penalties. Complaint, ¶ 160 (Plaintiffs are entitled "to seek and collect statutory penalties available under the Private Attorneys General Act and on behalf of the State of California"). Accordingly, such claims fall within the one-year statute of limitations under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §340(a).

3. Labor Code Section 226

Labor Code § 226 provides that a failure by an employer to permit a current or former employee to inspect or copy records as set forth in the section "entitles the current or former employee or the Labor Commissioner to recover a seven-hundred-fifty-dollar (\$750) penalty from

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the employer." Cal Lab Code § 226(f). An employee "may also bring an action for injunctive relief to ensure compliance with this section".

Courts have discussed the general characteristics of a penalty. In considering a statute that reduced a court reporter's compensation by one-half when a transcript was late, the court in County of San Diego v. Milotz, 46 Cal.2d 761 (1956), stated:

The term "penalty" has a very comprehensive meaning. While often used as synonymous with the word "punishment," or as including a sum payable upon the breach of a private contract, it has also the more restricted meaning of a sum of money made payable by way of punishment for the nonperformance of an act or for the performance of an unlawful act, and which, in the former case, stands in lieu of the act to be performed.

Id. at 766.

Causes of action "based upon statutes which provide for mandatory recovery of damages additional to actual losses incurred, such as treble damages, are considered penal in nature, and thus are governed by the one-year limitations period under section 340, subdivision (1)." Menefee v. Ostawari, 228 Cal. App. 3d 239, 243 (1991). The statutory penalty in Code of Civil Procedure section 340:

is one which an individual is allowed to recover against a wrong-doer, as a satisfaction for the wrong or injury suffered, and without reference to the actual damage sustained, or one which is given to the individual and the state as a punishment for some act which is in the nature of a public wrong.

County of Los Angeles v. Ballerino, 99 Cal. 593, 596 (1893). The foregoing cases indicate that a statute like Labor Code § 226 that imposes a payment without regard to the actual loss suffered is in the nature of a penalty.

Even Plaintiffs have indicated they are seeking penalties for violation of Labor Code § 226. 22 Complaint, ¶ 111 ("Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to penalties and attorneys' fees 23 pursuant to Labor Code § 111 and California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5.") Accordingly, 24 || because only penalties are sought, this cause of action is subject to the one-year statute of 25 | limitations.

Since Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed on May 30, 2006, the Seventh, Eighth and Thirteenth 27 Causes of Action must have arisen no earlier than May 30, 2005. Plaintiffs allege that Otsuka terminated her employment with Polo in or about November 2004 (Complaint, ¶ 1), Phipps in or about December 2004 (Complaint, ¶ 4).

These causes of action are time-barred by California's one-year statute of limitations for actions seeking penalties. Accordingly, Polo's Demurrer to the Seventh, Eighth and Thirteenth Causes of Action should be sustained as to Plaintiffs Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe.

E. THE DEMURRER TO THE ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT SHOULD BE SUSTAINED BECAUSE UNJUST ENRICHMENT IS NOT A CAUSE OF ACTION.

Polo hereby demurs to Plaintiffs' eleventh cause of action for unjust enrichment on the

Polo hereby demurs to Plaintiffs' eleventh cause of action for unjust enrichment on the ground that unjust enrichment is not a cause of action. Courts have recognized that a claim for unjust enrichment is, in effect, a claim for an award of restitution:

The first cause of action is labeled as one for "unjust enrichment." Unjust enrichment is not a cause of action, however, or even a remedy, but rather " "a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies" . . [Citation.] It is synonymous with restitution. [Citation.]"

McBride v. Boughton, 123 Cal.App.4th 379, 387 (2004), citing Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793 (2003).

Because unjust enrichment is not a cause of action, Polo's demurrer should be sustained.

17 IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Polo respectfully requests that the Court sustain its demurrer.

Dated: October 12, 2006

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP

William J. Goines, Esq. Jeremy A. Meier, Esq. Karen Rosenthal, Esq. Alisha M. Louie, Esq.

Attorneys for Defendants Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation; Polo Retail, LLC; Fashions Outlet of America, Inc.; and Polo Retail Corporation

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Otsuka, et al. v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation, et al.

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Case No. CGC-06-452655

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Cathy Sandifer, am a citizen of the United States, over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action. I am an employee of GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP, and my business address is 1900 University Avenue, Fifth Floor, East Palo Alto, CA 94303. On October 12, 2006, I served the following documents:

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

 by transmitting via FACSIMILE the document(s) listed above to the fax numbers) set forth
below, or as stated on the attached service list, on this date at approximately, from the
sending facsimile machine telephone number of 650-289-7893. The transmission was reported as
complete and without error by the machine. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule
2008(e)(4), I caused the machine to print a transmission record of the transmission, a copy of
which is attached to the original of this declaration. The transmission report was properly issued
by the transmitting facsimile machine.

- by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the UNITED STATES MAIL at East Palo Alto, California, addressed as set forth below.
- by OVERNIGHT MAIL by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed overnight mail envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, addressed as set forth below. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if delivery by Federal Express is more than one day after date of deposit with Federal Express.
- (BY MESSENGER PERSONAL SERVICE). I caused delivery of such envelope by hand to the offices of the addressee.

Patrick R. Kitchin, Esq. Law Offices of Patrick R. Kitchin 565 Commercial St., 4th Fl. San Francisco, CA 94111 (Fax: 415-627-9076) Daniel Feder, Esq. Law Offices of Daniel L. Feder 807 Montgomery St. San Francisco, CA 94133 (Fax: 415-391-9432)

I am readily familiar with the business practice of my place of employment in respect to the collection and processing of correspondence, pleadings and notices for mailing with United States Postal Service/Express Mail, Federal Express and other overnight mail services. The foregoing sealed envelope was placed for collection and mailing this date consistent with the ordinary business practice of my place of employment, so that it will be picked up this date with postage thereon fully prepaid at East Palo Alto, California, in the ordinary course of such business.

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	Proof of Service	

Proof of Service

WILLIAM J. GOINES (SBN 061290) JEREMY A. MEIER (SBN 139849) 2 KAREN ROSENTHAL (SBN 209419) ALISHA M. LOUIE (SBN 240863) 3 GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 1900 University Avenue, Fifth Floor East Palo Alto, California 94303 Telephone: (650) 328-8500 Facsimile: (650) 328-8508 Email: goinesw@gtlaw.com meieri@gtlaw.com rosenthalk@gtlaw.com louiea@gtlaw.com

Attorneys for Defendants Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation; Polo Retail, LLC; Fashions Outlet of America, Inc.; and Polo Retail Corporation

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

ANN OTSUKA, an individual; JANIS KEEFE, an individual: CORINNE PHIPPS, an individual; and JUSTIN KISER, an individual; and on behalf of all other similarly situated,

Plaintiff(s),

POLO RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation; POLO RETAIL, LLC, a Delaware Corporation; POLO RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, doing business in California as POLO RETAIL CORP; FASHIONS OUTLET OF AMERICA, INC., a Delaware Corporation and DOES 1-500, inclusive,

Defendant(s)...

Case No. CGC-06-452655

[PROPOSED] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

BY FAX

May 30, 2006 Date Filed:

The Demurrer of Defendants Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation; Polo Retail, LLC; Fashions Outlet of America, Inc.; and Polo Retail Corporation (collectively referred to herein as

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"Defendants" or "Polo") to the First Amended Complaint ("Complaint") of Plaintiffs Ann Otsuka, an individual; Janis Keefe, an individual; Corinne Phipps, an individual; and Justin Kiser, an individual; and on behalf of all other similarly situated (collectively referred to herein as "Plaintiffs"), having come on regularly for hearing before this court on November 15, 2006, and the pleadings and oral arguments having been considered by the court, and good cause appearing therefore.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

- 1. Polo's Demurrer to the First Cause of Action to the Complaint is sustained without leave to amend. The First Cause of Action for Fraud fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants under Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(e).
- 2. Polo's Demurrer to the Second Cause of Action to the Complaint is sustained without leave to amend. The Second Cause of Action for False Imprisonment fails to state facts 13 sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants under Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(e).
- 3. [Alternatively,] Polo's Demurrer to the Second Cause of Action to the Complaint is 16 sustained without leave to amend with respect to Plaintiffs Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe. Claims by Plaintiffs Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe are time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth 18 in California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a).
- Polo's Demurrer to the Seventh Cause of Action to the Complaint is sustained 20 without leave to amend with respect to Plaintiffs Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe. Claims by Plaintiffs Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe are time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a).
 - 5. Polo's Demurrer to the Eighth Cause of Action to the Complaint is sustained without leave to amend with respect to Plaintiffs Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe. Claims by Plaintiffs Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe are time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a).

1	6. Polo's Demurrer to the Eleventh Cause of Action to the Complaint is sustained
2	without leave to amend. The Eleventh Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment fails to state facts
3	sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants under Code of Civil Procedure
4	§ 430.10(e).
5	7. Polo's Demurrer to the Thirteenth Cause of Action to the Complaint is sustained
6	without leave to amend with respect to Plaintiffs Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe. Claims by Plaintiffs
7	Otsuka, Phipps and Keefe are time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in
8	California Code of Civil Procedure § 340(a).
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10	Dated:, 2006.
11	Judge of the Superior Court
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[PROPOSED] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO FAC

Otsuka, et al. v. Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation, et al.

Case No. CGC-06-452655

2 PROOF OF SERVICE

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[PROPOSED] ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

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